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I
When William Bradford, Governor of Plymouth Colony, wrote his history of
"Plimouth Plantation," he felt it necessary to introduce his subject by saying that he
must "begine at ye very roote and rise of ye matter." If there has been failure to
understand fully what Congress undertook to accomplish by the legislation de-
signed to give relief to men engaged in operative railroading, it is due to the fact
that there has been little, if any, inclination anywhere to get at "ye very roote and
rise of ye matter."
It is not new or unusual that the legislative necessity for the declaration by gov-
ernment of national public policy, in the interest of justice and the public welfare,
arises out of the nature and importance of some particular undertaking, business
or vocation-its hazards, its isolation, its limited or farflung field of operations,
and the importance of the contribution made by those so engaged to social, political
and economic progress. Whether such a public policy, based upon these and other
factors more or less potent, is expressed in usage, custom, and practice, or in consti-
tutions and statutes, its claims to continued public approval must rest upon its social
value, as proved through time and experience. The survival of such a policy ex-
pressed in a statute, in the face of continuous and concerted attack upon it by those
who profess a philosophy hostile to it and by powerful interests claiming to be
adversely affected by it, through long periods of time during which the policy has
been steadily strengthened and broadened by the law-making body which declared
it and by the courts charged with the duty of construing it, constitutes the strongest
proof of the soundness of the policy.
In seeking to appraise the social, political and economic value of a public policy
in the interest of those engaged in a particular vocation, it is not enough to point
to some other class or group in society which is not given similar privileges. The
search for sustaining or destructive factors must be directed at the peculiar prob-
lems and the contribution to social progress of the group benefited. The modern
rules and practices in admiralty, for example, have their origin in ancient usage,
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custom, and practice developed and proved through time and experience, as best
suited for use in the government of men who earned their livelihood on the seas.
Such rules and practices, it is said, were first collected into manuscript and established
as a public policy with reference to seamen, by the inhabitants of the little island
of Rhodes. These ancient laws of the sea developed, through centuries, into a system
of jurisprudence so different from that which governed those who earned their
livelihood on land that the Roman Emperor, Augustus, could declare:1
I am the master of the earth, but the Rhodian law is mistress of the sea.
In admiralty today, in the United States, the seaman who seeks there a vindication
of the rights guaranteed to him by admiralty law, is treated as a ward of the court.'
It is not without significance that when Congress gave to seamen an additional
remedy in the law courts, it granted to them the benefits of the same national public
policy it had declared for railroad men in the Federal Employers' Liability Act 3
Transport, either upon land or upon the sea, has always determined whether
social, political and economic life should be local or national. The most potent
factor in the revolutionary change from feudalism to nationalism, was the improve-
ments in transport by sea and by land. Introduction of the locomotive and the rail-
way, in the nineteenth century, inaugurated a social and economic revolution. The
railways, followed in turn by the steamship, the telegraph, the telephone, the auto-
mobile, the aeroplane, and radio communication, transformed the world. The im-
portance of the railway in the development of our own country was within the vision
of its pioneers. In 828, one of those pioneers, Charles Carroll, the sole survivor at
that time of that great group of patriots who signed the Declaration of Independence,
turned the first spade of earth in the construction of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road, at Baltimore, Maryland. He made a speech that day in which, referring to his
act of turning that first spade of dirt in the construction of what is now one of
our great railroad systems, he said :'
I consider this among the most important acts of my life; second only to my signing
of the Declaration of Independence; if even it be second to that.
When Charles Carroll uttered these significant words, there were approximately
23 miles of railroad in the United States. The opening two years later of the few
miles of railroad, the construction of which was launched by that vital spade of
dirt, by the Baltimore and Ohio and of the first few miles of the South Carolina
Railroad, grown now into the great Southern Railway System, was the real beginning
of the railway epoch-the age of man's most significant advancement. Nearly forty
years later, May io, 869, the glory and the achievement of that era were symbolized
'James Henry Wallock, Commentary on Maritime Workers, UN nED STATEs Com ANNOTATED, TITLE
46, Pp. 211, 214.
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by the driving of gold and silver spikes where East met West, at the linking of the
Union and Central Pacific Railroads at Promontory, Utah, to form the first great
transcontinental steel highway of commerce in America. In the next twenty years
it was possible to travel from the Atlantic Coast to the Pacific Coast over at least
six different railroad systems. The men who furnished the courage, the genius, and
*the vision to bring about this transportation epoch in human history, the end of
which is still beyond far horizons of the indomitable will and spirit of man, have
enduring places in history along with the great navigators of the seas, who discovered
not only new routes of trade and commerce, but new worlds to serve as new stages
upon which man could work and dream out his destiny.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first ten years of the twenti-
eth century, the fact that there is another side to this picture of glory and achieve-
ment, burst upon the public consciousness. There are the multitudes of men who
as individuals have remained 6bscure, but without whom those giant enterprises
could have gained neither wealth nor power nor usefulness in the nation's economy.
They are the men who hold in their hands the safety of our goods and merchandise
when we ship them from one place to another and of our own lives when we go,
ourselves, on a journey-the men who have the hazardous job of maintaining the
lines and of operating the trains on which we ride or transport our goods. For
them, it appeared that these steel paths of glory led but to the grave.
President Harrison, speaking of the plight of these men in his message to Con-
gress in 1889, said:'
It is a reproach to our civilization that any class of American workmen, should in the
pursuit of a necessary and useful vocation, be subjected to a peril of life and limb as
great as that of a soldier in time of war.
As railroads lengthened to traverse state after state of the union and finally to
span and spider-web the continent, such regulation as there was in the interest of
the safety of the lives and limbs of operative railroad men fell successively to the
states through which the lines ran. There was not, nor indeed could there be, any
uniformity in such state laws as were placed upon statute books to control or to
ameliorate these conditions. The great railroad corporations became laws unto them-
selves. Railway cars were coupled together with what was known as the link and
pin system, requiring the trainmen to step in front of cars or go between them to
make the couplings. Cars were equipped with hand brakes, requiring men to go
upon moving cars to stop them or to control their speed. In addition, as these
dangerous devices and methods began to give way to time-saving and, incidentally,
to life-saving coupling, braking, and other devices, such devices notoriously lacked
uniformity. This lack of uniformity arising from chaotic state regulation and the
great numbers and types adopted by the various railroads in various states con-
tributed greatly to the casualty lists among operative railroad men. A brakeman's
'See Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. i, x9 (1904); 12 MESSAOES AN) PApEns OF TM PnES-
DEN'S 5486 (Richardson ed. 1897).
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chances of dying a natural death were in i888, i to 4.7.6 The average life expectancy
of a switchman in 1893 was seven years.
The development and final adoption of the national public policy forecast by the
President in his message to Congress in 1889, is a story of dark and bitter years.
The men, themselves, in the face of warnings by their employers that they would
lose their jobs for doing so, played a significant role in the process of improving
conditions, by organizing themselves into transportation brotherhoods-the Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers, founded in 1863; the Order of Railway Conductors in
i868; the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen in 1873; and the
Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen, later the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
in 1883. These Brotherhoods, strictly speaking, were not in those days labor unions.
They were, in fact, fraternal bodies, organized for insurance protection against
injury and death in the course of employment. The meager sum that could be paid
in fraternal benefits to totally disabled members or to the next of kin of those who
were killed was virtually the only protection the men had or could get.
The period intervening between the beginning in America of the railway epoch
and the final enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act in 19o8, saw the rise
and fall of laissez faire-the doctrine of non-interference by government in matters
concerning labor. That doctrine, under the influence of the philosophy of David
Ricardo, the English economist of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
in which the laborer was regarded as merely a chattel in the hands of capital, bore
down with heavy tragedy upon the operating railroadman. He stood helpless and
alone under ruthless practices of his railroad employer. He feared even to approach
his employer except to render beneficial service. He took such wage as was offered,
endured such working conditions as he found, and, in fear, obeyed such rules as
were made by management. When he became a casualty of his hazardous employ-
ment, he took what his employer offered him, which, if indeed any offer at all was
made, was so inadequate as to bear no relation to the damages suffered. There was,
of course, the common-law right of action in court open to him, for damages
resulting from his employer's negligence, in case he determined not to accept the
amount, if any, offered him in settlement of his claim. If he chose to follow that
course, he found that his employer could there urge judge-made defenses that, for
all practical purposes, insulated the employer from bearing any of the cost of the
human overhead of this highly hazardous business-the fellow-servant rule, contrib-
utory negligence as a bar to the action, and assumption of risk. He might also be
met there by some contract or device by which the employer had successfully
exempted itself from liability.
The real essence of the national problem, presented by the growing casualties
among railroad men and the consequent burden that was cast upon these workers
and their families, was to resolve the sharp conflict between the brutal philosophy
of Ricardo and the humanitarian doctrines of the great social philosophers of the
ITHIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMSSION 85 (1889).
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time in favor of this important group of men who earned their livelihood on land.
It was a dramatic demonstration of these sharply conflicting views in the period
when the states, alone, were frantically seeking answers to the appalling casualties
among operative railroad men that lighted a torch and placed it in the hands of a
man who, with the aid and backing of five presidents of the United States and of
the railroad Brotherhoods, became the father of the federal Acts declaring this
national public policy. A bill requiring grab irons, as a safety measure, to be placed
upon freight cars was introduced in the Massachusetts legislature and was assigned
to a joint committee of the two Houses to hold hearings on the proposal. A railroad
official at the hearing denounced the proposal as an outrage. "Why," the official
exclaimed, "every time a fellow grabbed that thing, he would give the car such a
wrench, it would spring a leak and ruin the contents." The objector was thinking
of the leaky car and the bill for damaged merchandise and not of the trainman who
might seize the grab iron only to save his life.1
A member of the legislature and of this joint committee, was Edward A. Moseley.
He was not a railroad man. In his early life he was a seaman. The effect upon him
of the grab iron incident led him into his real life's work-that of securing federal
relief for operative railroad men.
The Interstate Commerce Act was passed by Congress, March 7, x887,s as the
inevitable result of the proved inability of state governments to deal with even the
ordinary problems of commerce between the several states. That Act created the
Interstate Commerce Commission, as the corporate agent of the Federal'Government
with administrative and quasi-judicial power over the railroads operating in interstate
commerce.
Mr. Moseley became the first Secretary of the Commission in 1887. In the first
year of his secretaryship he caused the Commission to employ a statistician; in his
second year, with the statistician's report in his hands, he began to inform the public
about the high casualties in railroading. On January 31, 1889, he called a conference
of all state railroad commissioners to be held at the office of the Commission in
Washington on March 5, 1889. The conference was attended by representatives of
every state and territory with but few exceptions. One of the major questions dis-
cussed was safety appliances in railway transportation. A resolution was unani-
mously adopted by the Conference urging the Commission to develop and recom-
mend national measures that would give relief to railroad employees, thousands of
whom were being injured and killed every year. Pursuant to this resolution, on
May 17, 1889, Mr. Moseley addressed a circular relating to federal regulation of
safety appliances on the railroads to all state railroad commissioners, to the principal
officers of railway companies, to the railroad transportation Brotherhoods, and to
other important groups and individuals. The state railroad commissioners, with
few notable exceptions, favored such federal regulation. The Brotherhoods gave
T JAMEs MORGAN, ThE LIFE WORK OF EDWARD A. MOSELEY IN TH SERVIcE OF HUMANITY 57 (1913).
8 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §i et seq. (1946).
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strong support to the proposal as did the Master Car Builders Association, The
Engineering Journal, and many civil engineers and other interested and farseeing in-
dividuals. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, then the Brotherhood of Rail-
road Brakemen, in addition to a strong-favoring letter to the Commission, filed a
Petition addressed to the Commission in which it was said :?
Each of the undersigned is in actual service as a railroad brakeman or has been em-
ployed a sufficient length of time to become fully acquainted with the duties and perils
of the position, and although some of us have been promoted, we most earnestly appeal
to your honorable body to urge upon Congress the necessity of national legislation in this
matter, that the terrible slaughter of brakemen on the railroads of this country every year
may be largely diminished.
The railroads which answered the circular were in unanimous opposition to the
Commission's proposal of federal regulation.
The national public policy, forecast by the arresting description of conditions by
Mr. Moseley and by President Harrison in his 1889 message to Congress, had been
initiated. These historic steps and events led through Mr. Moseley's continued
pressure and the growing public concern and demand for relief, to the enactment by
Congress in 1893 of the original Federal Safety Appliance Act. °
Mr. Moseley did not stop there. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen held
its First Biennial Convention at Boston, Massachusetts, in October 1893. It held a
public reception there on October 17, at which the governor of Massachusetts, the
mayor of Boston, Edward A. Moseley, L. S. Coffin, and the executive officers of the
labor organizations of the country gave addresses. Mr. Moseley in his address said
in part:"
There is something appalling in the statement that more hard-working and faithful
railway employees in the United States, went down in sudden death last year than the
entire number of Union men who died at the Battle of the Wilderness; nearly as many
as those who died the bitter death at Spottsylvania; more than three times the number
of the Union dead at Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge and Orchard Knob combined,
and that more of the grand army of railway men of this country were cut and bruised
and maimed and mangled last year than all the Union wounded and missing on the
bloody field of Gettysburg; nearly equal in number to the wounded and missing in the
reign of death and devastation at Shiloh, first and second Bull Run and Antietam com-
bined; while there traveled under the care and guidance of this clear-headed and vigilant
army of railway workers 560,958,21I passengers with so much ease and safety that only
one in every 1,491,910 was killed and only one in every 173,833 was injured from all
causes, including their own carelessness.
We are standing upon the shores of the Atlantic. Looking to the east we behold a
broad expanse of water. Upon this coast-within sound of the roar of the surf-not a
storm arises but a prayer goes up from the good housewife for the safety of the poor
sailor struggling with the elements. Why is this solicitude so fervently expressed?
oTinRD ANNuAL REPORT OF TnE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COasmMssION 340 (1889).
102 7 STAT. 531, 45 U. S. C. §§1-7 (r946).
21 Io Rn.RoAD TRpANmEN'S JouRNAL 930-939, 853 (Oct. 1893); MoRGAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at
6o-62.
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From time immemorial the limitless deep has been associated with peril to human life,
and the most anxious feelings of our race have been evoked in behalf of those "who
go down to the sea in ships." For centuries every civilized language has, in prose and
poetry, extolled the heroism of the sailor, and sympathized with the dangers and sacrifices
of the toiler who earns his livelihood upon the unstable elements. The sound of the
waves and the heavy blasts call attention to the fact and tend to perpetuate one of the
finest traits in our human nature-a brotherly interest in the welfare of a worthy portion
of the community.
And yet, how little of this commendable sympathy is bestowed on the equally brave
and far more exposed toiler working in the freight yard or on the raill He, too, is
traveling a deck. To be swept from it will hurl him to eternity in a far more sudden
and agonizing way than the poor fellow carried by a wave from the deck of a vessel. The
latter, in many instances, has a chance-with the help of a resolute heart and sinewy arm
-- of rescuing himself from a watery grave. How vast the difference with the victim
of the railway, the great modern agent of civilization, as essential to human intercourse
as the ship has been since the earliest times!
Yet dangers to the trainmen do not come home to the good people. Their attention
has not yet been sufficiently awakened to the subject. Let them think of the fated fellow
who slips between the cars and whose only possible escape is by a desperate grasp at their
icy sides; or of him who, swept from the running board of the rapidly moving car, is
hurled to instant and certain destruction.
Dangers beset him everywhere. As he works amid an intricate warp of iron-rails, the
next step may fasten his heel in the deadly unblocked frog, holding him in a vise, suffer-
ing an agony of suspense, while the wheel bears down upon him to mangle his poor
body and crush his life out.
Let people reflect that it requires fully as much courage and nerve to peer out into
the darkness and catch sight of a few feet of gleaming rails in front, all else the blackness
of night, as it does to stand on the bridge of a ship and with straining eyes endeavor to
avoid the passing vessel, the derelict, or the iceberg.
In 1895, two years later, he caused the first Employers' Liability Act to be in-
troduced in Congress as a sort of trial balloon. He drafted the bill and aroused
such interest in its objectives that he was able to enlist the vigorous support of
President Theodore Roosevelt who drove it through the Fifty-Ninth Congress in
19o6.12 Congress, committed to the purpose of the law, which in January 19o8 was
held unconstitutional,'8 under the lash of several vigorous messages from the Presi-
dent, enacted the constitutional Act three months later, April 22, 19o8.,
The original Safety Appliance Act of 1893 was extended and strengthened by many
amendments, beginning in 1896 and continuing through I94o.10 In i91o Congress
amended the Act'" by adding Sections 11-i6 to impose upon the Interstate Com-
merce Commission the duty of adopting rules and regulations designating and
standardizing the number, dimensions, location, and manner of application of all
safety appliances on all railroad cars and other equipment. Pursuant to the Act as
12 34 STAT. 232 (x9o6).
"a The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (I9o8).
2" 35 STAT. 65 (igo8), 45 U. S. C. §§51-6o (1946).
ix 27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§i-46 (946).
1636 STAT. 298 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §§x-16 (1946).
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thus amended, the Interstate Commerce Commission made its order of March 13,
1911, standardizing all safety appliances and equipment 7 These rules and regula-
tions are integral parts of the Safety Appliance Act and have the force of law.i s
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 19o8, venue was left by Congress
under the then general venue statute for federal circuit and district courts. That
statute provided:"°
. . . no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any
original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant;
but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between the
citizens of different States, suits shall be brought only in the district of the residence of
either the plaintiff or the defendant.
An employee suing under the Act was thus compelled to sue his employer in
the state where it was incorporated. By Igio, litigation under the Act in the inter-
vening two years convinced Congress that this limitation as to venue was unjust to
the employee, and in that year the present venue clause was added to the act. The
amendatory bill, as first drawn, made causes of action arising under the Act com-
pletely transitory by fixing venue as :2o
* * * the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, or in which
the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be found at the time of com-
mencing such action.
It was considered that this language gave too wide a choice and might result in
injustice to the carrier. The language adopted, after much debate, was:21
Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States,
in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose,
or in which the defendant shall be doing business, at the time of commencing such action.
Senator Borah of Idaho, in charge of the amendment in the Senate, in stating its
purpose and scope said:2
The bill enables the plaintiff to find the corporation at any point or place or state where
it is actually carrying on business, and there lodge his action, if he chooses to do so.
It was in connection with this vital amendment to the original Act that the
national public policy declared by the Act was fully expressed in Congress :23
This subject is referred to here only for the purpose of calling upon Congress to make
entirely manifest the good faith of the legislature in the enactment of the employers'
liability law, which places such stringent liability upon the railroads for injuries to their
employees as to compel the highest safeguarding of the lives and limbs of the men in
this dangerous employment. The tremendous loss of life and limb on the railroads of
17 49 CODE FED. REGS. Parts 131-136 (949).
18 Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. R., 317 U. S. 481, 488 (1943).
1t 36 STAT. x168 (i911), 28 U. S. C. §112(a) (1927).
20 45 CONG. REC. 2253 (IgO).
21 36 STAT. 291 (igi), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).
22 45 CoNG. Rac. 4034 (1910).
" Id. at 4041.
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this country is appalling. The total casualties to trainmen on the interstate railroads of
the United States for the year19o8 was 281,645.
It was the intention of Congress in the enactment of this law originally and it may
be presumed to be the intention of the present Congress, to shift the burden of the loss
resulting from these casualties from "those least able to bear it" and place it upon those
who can, as the Supreme Court said in the Taylor case (210 U. S. 281), "measurably
control their causes."
The passage of the original act and the perfection thereof by the amendments herein
proposed stand forth as a declaration of public policy to radically change, as far as con-
gressional power can extend, those rules of the common law which the President, in a
recent speech at Chicago, September i6, 19o9, characterized as "unjust." President Taft
in his address at Chicago, September i6, i909, referred "to the continuance of unjust
rules of law exempting employers from liability for accidents to laborers."
This public policy which we now declare is based upon the failure of the common-law
rules as to liability for accident, to meet the modern industrial conditions and is based not
alone upon the failure of those rules in the United States, but their failure in other coun-
tries as well....
The passage of the law was urged upon the strongest and highest considerations of
justice and promotion of the public welfare. It was largely influenced by the strong message
of President Roosevelt to the Sixtieth Congress in December, 19o7, in which the basis of
the legislation was clearly and strongly placed upon the ground of justice to the railroad
workmen of this country and in which legislation was urged to the limit of congressional
power upon this subject.
These expressed purposes of Congress and the policy thus announced did not
meet with a friendly reception by the courts. After the adoption of the i9io amend-
ment, the Employers' Liability Act ran the rapids of streams of restrictive interpre-
tations and of constructions placed upon its provisions by the courts which reimposed
many of the old common-law defenses that, in the original Act, it was the intention
of Congress to abolish. The Act was so battered and damaged at the hands of the
courts by 1939 that further rehabilitation and repair by Congress became essential.
The 1939 amendment repaired the damage to the Act's provisions that had resulted
from its turbulent passage through the courts. That amendment made the purpose
of Congress in passing the law in the first place so clear and positive as to leave no
reasonable loophole for further innovations by the courts.
2 4
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an impressive series of decisions
rendered subsequent to the 1939 amendment and under the unmistakable authority
of its provisions, has written what may be accepted as the brightest page in the long
struggle of operative railroad men to achieve justice and an equal position of bar-
gaining power with their powerful employers in securing adequate safeguards to
life and limb and adequate compensation for wrongful injury and death in the
course of their highly hazardous employment. The court placed the capstone upon
the policy of national regulation of matters concerning the welfare of this important
group of men who earn their livelihood on land, by welding together as the founda-
2453 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. §51 (1946); see Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion,
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 68 (1948).
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tion of that policy the two branches of the legislation in which the national policy
is declared. In Uric v. Thompson, the Court placed the Federal Safety Appliance
Acts in pari materia with and supplemental to the FELA and said:25
In this view the Safety Appliance Acts, together with the Boiler Inspection Act, are
substantively if not in form amendments to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. They
dispense, for the purposes of employees' suits, with the necessity of proving that violations
of the safety statutes constitute negligence; and making proof of such violations is effective
to show negligence as a matter of law. Thus taken, as has been the consistent practice,
the Boiler Inspection and Safety Appliance Acts cannot be regarded as statutes wholly
separate from and independent of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. They are rather
supplemental to it, having the purpose and effect of facilitating employee recovery, not of
restricting such recovery or making it impossible.
Thus, the national public policy forecast by President Harrison in his 1889 mes-
sage to Congress, like grist from the slow mills of the gods, came to full realization.
II
In the foregoing pages, it was the purpose of the writer to transpose, as nearly
as possible for this present year of 1952, the view of the conditions out of which this
national public policy arose that was held by those men of the past who initiated
that policy and wrote it into law. There, in order that we may understand what that
policy is, we look forward through their eyes. It is now, after forty-five years since
the policy was declared, essential in our appraisal of that policy, to look backward
through our own eyes. The laws in which this national public policy was declared,
were not self-executing. They were but the ounce of prevention. There still had to
be the pound of cure.
The scope of the legislation has been recently defined by both Congress and the
Supreme Court. Congress, in the 1939 amendment, clearly defined what it meant
to do in previous amendments and the original Act:
2 6
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the
furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely
and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall for the purposes of this
chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be
considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter. (Italics supplied.)
Congress here used the all-inclusive language that was used in Section 5 of the
original Act2" in defining contracts and devices which it declared void when their
effect was to exempt the carrier from "any liability under this chapter." Although
the Supreme Court has not directly construed the quoted provision, the Court's
interpretation of its all-inclusive language is foretold by the Court's ruling upon the
identically all-inclusive language of Section 5 in Duncan v. Thompson, where the
Court said :2"
o 337 U. S. 163, 189 (1949).
20 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. §51 (1946).
27 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §55 (1946).
28 315 U. S. x, 6 (1942).
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Because the various state measures directed against contractual arrangements intended
to exempt employers from liability were thus laid before Congress, the rejection of the
restrictive language of §3 of the old act indicates a deliberate abandonment of the limita-
tions of that section. And the adoption of §5 of the present act, without adding any of
the other limitations which some of the state statutes had embodied, argues persuasively
that Congress wanted §5 to have the full eflect that its comprehensive phraseology im-
plies. (Italics supplied.)
Congress had legislated to the limit of its power over commerce upon the subject.
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden in defining this power, said:"
This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.
When Congress, in the circumstances described above, exercised this power in
the enactment of these laws originally and in strengthening them through amend-
ments, it left no element of justice to railroad workmen in that field, unprotected.
But, inevitably, the benefits under the Acts accrued only to those workmen, or to
their next of kin, who could successfully invoke the provisions of the laws to
enforce the rights and privileges therein granted. Edward A. Moseley, who with
the assistance of the Brotherhoods, had initiated, drafted, and caused these laws to
be introduced in Congress, and who so skillfully and persistently engineered them
through the legislative mill, was also the first to realize the handicap under which
the workers and their families must proceed in the enforcement of their rights.
They were usually without funds and were ignorant of their rights under the Act.
Its enactment found them in despair in the face of their condition and paralyzed
by the fear of losing their jobs and such security as was furnished by their wages.
Characteristically, Mr. Mosely sought a method of overcoming these handicaps.
When the 19o6 Act became law, railroad attorneys promptly assembled to plan a cam-
paign against it in the courts. Mr. Moseley successfully urged upon the government
the adoption of a vigorous defense. He prepared a lengthy paper outlining a plan
of action and submitted it to the administration. In it he suggested the preparation
of a general brief for use as far as applicable in any case that might arise under the
law and, in conclusion, said :30
It may be a new theory, but is it not well within the province of the attorney-general
of the United States, when the constitutionality of any act passed by Congress is called
in question, to use the resources of the government to the fullest extent in his power
to protect the integrity of that act, particularly when, as in this case, the measure is one
which is designed to protect the just rights of a vast body of our country's working
citizens, and to relieve them from the disabilities entailed upon them by the failure of
powerful railroad corporations to provide suitable appliances and facilities for the pro-
tection of the lives and limbs of their employees?
29 9 Wheat. 1, 9 (U. S. 1824).
30 JAiis MORGAN, THE LIx Woiu OF EDWARD A. MOSELEY IN THE SERVlca OF HUMANITY 109-110
(1913).
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His suggestion was taken up at a cabinet meeting and the government agreed to
follow Mr. Moseley's plan. In announcing the government's decision to intervene
in defense of the law, he said:31
I regard this action as one of the most important events in the interest of labor that
has ever occurred. Were railway employees, who seek to obtain damages for injuries
received, left to their own resources there is no question that the benefits which this
law seeks to confer upon them would be neutralized or entirely destroyed by the action
of the courts.
The railroad companies have the strongest array of legal talent in the country, and
this talent will all be directed toward defeating the ends of any such law as this. No
private individual can hope to cope with such power; it will be impossible for any railway
employee, who invokes the aid of this law, to employ attorneys who can successfully meet
the arguments of counsel for the railroad companies. But with the resources of the de-
partment of justice placed at his command, in order to protect the integrity of the law,
the railway employee is placed on a plane of practical equality with the railway com-
pany, and he is thus insured a square deal.
The United States, through the Attorney General's office, filed briefs amicus
curiae, in accordance with this agreement, in both the First and Second Employers'
Liability Act Cases.3 2
If the above language of Mr. Moseley was prophecy, its indisputable truth has
long since been established. That is not strange, for it is the language of a man who
not only knew what was taking place, but could see into the future from the vantage
point of thirty years of intimate experience with the problems of operative railroad
men, with the attitude of the railroads toward their employees, and with the ob-
tuseness or hostility of many of the courts where such problems were involved. He
knew that, notwithstanding the positive expressions of the law, employees would
still be confronted by the same philosophy that revealed itself to him in the startling
grab iron incident referred to above. This was, indeed, what happened.
Mr. Moseley did not live to visit the Supreme Court, as was his custom on opinion
days, on January 15, 1912, when the Act of 19o8 was held valid, but he had estab-
lished a precedent in the intervention of the United States on the side of the railroad
employees, which was later followed by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in
developing a similar plan which has assured these men and their families of able and
honest legal representation in cases arising under the Act.
During the years from 19o8, when the Act first became law, to 193o, when a
Legal Aid Plan was finally adopted by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen having
the same purpose as the Moseley plan, it became increasingly evident that the
national public policy, which the laws represented, was being widely flouted and
defeated. Although the Brotherhoods had, by every means available, sought to
inform their members of their rights under the law, fears as to their jobs and of the
loss of such security as those jobs gave them had over the years been so instilled into
them by their railroad employers, as to offer so much resistance to general accept-
Id. at I10.
2o207 U. S. 463 (I9o8); 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
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ance of advice, even from their union officials, that little headway could be made
through these processes.
In these circumstances, the Brotherhood conceived it to be its duty to do everything
that was essential and reasonably adapted to furnish any one of its members who
had been injured in the course of his employment, or his next of kin in the event
his injuries were fatal, assistance in adjusting or enforcing his claim against his
employer. This was as certainly within the scope of its great purposes as were any
of its activities affecting wages, hours, or conditions of work.
In 1928, ambulance chasing came under investigation by the courts of Ohio, New
York, and other states. In the course of extended hearings on that subject, the
activities of corporation claim agents were also investigated. In a partial report by
Judge E. D. Fritch of Summit County, Ohio, who was in charge of the Ohio in-
vestigation, he observed 33
The great inequality in position and in bargaining power between the corporation
claim agent and the injured person, is sufficient justification for such legal measures as
will safeguard the injured person when he undertakes to make his own settlement.
Taking more or less drastic action against soliciting lawyers, and at the same time per-
mitting claim agents to pursue their nefarious practices will not remedy the situation dis-
closed by the evidence. The public interest which of course includes that of injured
persons, requires that both evils should be effectively dealt with.
In New York, Justice Wasservogel who was in charge of the investigation there,
heard more than one thousand witnesses. His report was made the subject of an
editorial in the American Bar Association Journal for November, 1928, entitled,
"Nationwide War on 'Ambulance Chasers.'" The writer of the editorial, after
reviewing the report, said:34
It is worth noting that the improper practices found were not confined to the am-
bulance chasing lawyer-the attorney for the plaintiff "The evidence before me," says
Mr. Justice Wasservogel in his report, "shows that casualty companies, transportation
companies and other corporate defendants have engaged in practices equally reprehensible.
Frequently the insurance adjuster races with the 'ambulance chaser' to the bedside of the
injured person to obtain a release from him while he is overwrought and in pressing need
of money. If a release cannot be obtained, the injured person is asked to sign a statement
of the circumstances of the accident or is plied with questions. The oral or written state-
ments extracted do not present a fair or complete picture. Nevertheless, they are used
against the plaintiffs at the trial with exaggerated and harmful effect. Furthermore, repre.
sentatives of some corporate defendants have not hesitated to effect settlements directly
with claimants whom they knew to be represented by attorneys. This practice is unfair
to such attorneys and deprives the clients of the benefit of their advice."
Under such conditions as those set forth in the remarks of counsel and in this extract
from the Justice's report, it goes almost without saying that the victims of accidents
have been notoriously exploited and that justice in most of such cases has become the
merest travesty.
x31 Omo BAR Ass' REP. 301, 302, 304 (Nov. 1928).
1 4 A. B. A. J. 561, 563 (1928).
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At the time these investigations were in progress and these reports were being
made, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was carrying on an investigation of
its own. As a result of its findings, the president of the Brotherhood in his annual
report for 1930, said :35
During the course of my several years experience as an officer of the Brotherhood
it has come to my attention on a number of occasions, that injured members of the
organization, and the dependents of members who had been killed while engaged in
railroad service, had fared rather badly at the hands of railroad claim agents in some
instances, as well as at the hands of so-called ambulance chasing lawyers in other in-
stances.
In many cases settlements wholly inadequate in the light of the seriousness of the
injuries and the responsibility of the employers had been made with members of the
Brotherhood who were either entirely devoid of any knowledge of their rights in such
matters, or who had been induced to make cheap settlements by misrepresentations in-
dulged in by those who sought to effectuate these settlements. In still other cases, at-
torneys had either suffered defeat in law suits because of their inexperience or lack of
ability to properly prosecute railroad damage claims.
In many cases attorneys had charged the injured men what appeared to be highly
exorbitant fees for the service rendered.
To meet this situation, it was proposed that a Legal Aid Department be set up
as part of the Brotherhood's activities in the interest of its injured members and
their next of kin. The general counsel of the Brotherhood at that time, in justify-
ing such a department, said in his annual report for i 929 :6
The word "brotherhood" has a peculiarly significant meaning. It is supposed to
indicate a fraternal spirit of helpfulness. Its purpose should be to render aid when
distress comes; to offer help when help is really needed. A well man may be inde-
pendent, but disability, sorrow and suffering create dependence. To desert a brother
at such a time, when hardship threatens him and his family, is to make the term
"brotherhood" seem like hollow mockery. The highest service any Brotherhood can
render is to aid and protect its members when trouble comes, not alone in health, but
in the hour of affliction. It undoubtedly would be a welcome thought to the members
of the organization to know that when misfortune comes, they may turn for aid and
advice to their own Brotherhood and receive the help and counsel they so sorely need.
It is a matter of vital importance to our members that they shall not be kept in ignorance
of their rights so that cheap and unfair settlements may be made. On the contrary pro-
visions should be made for advising them of their rights and in assisting them to obtain
them in so far as it is practical and consistent to do so.
The department was created by dividing the United States into sixteen regional
areas, determined by: the density of membership in those areas; the character of the
railroads, including mileage of tracks serving the area; and the accessibility of the
lawyers selected, from different parts of the territory for which they were selected. -
Sixteen such areas, including the one wherein the Brotherhood had its principal
3 BRO HERHOOD OF RAiLROAD TRAINMEN, REPORT 0F THE PRESIDENT 262 (1930).
o BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, REPORT OF Tom J. McGRATH, GENERAL COUNSEL, TO A. F.
WHITNEY, PRESIDENT 12 (July, 1929).
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office, were chosen. The general counsel for the Brotherhood visited each of the
selected areas and made an investigation of attorneys available as regional counsel.
Their selection was based upon their reputation for skill and experience in handling
personal injury claims, upon their reputation for honesty and fair dealing with their
clients, and upon their being recommended by local federal and state court judges.
Agreements were entered into with fifteen lawyers or law firms located in New
York City, Boston, Minneapolis, Syracuse (New York), Cleveland, Chicago, Port-
land (Oregon), Kansas City (Missouri), St. Louis, Houston, Baltimore, Birming-
ham, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Denver.T
A regional counsel, at first, was required to handle cases on a contingent fee
basis of 20 per cent of the amount recovered. He was required to remit 5 per cent
to the department to cover the overhead expense and might keep x5 per cent for
his fee. The department then required the observance of certain rules and practices
which were a part of the contract. However, the attorney fulfilled every obligation
he had undertaken to the Brotherhood when he fulfilled his full professional duty
to the employee client.
Another feature of the plan was for the Brotherhood to employ skilled and
experienced investigators and, when requested by the claimant, to send them into
any regional area to assist an injured man or his next of kin in securing the facts
and all other information, incident to and pertinent in the preparation of his case,
for purposes both of settlement and suit in the event a fair amount could not be
agreed upon in settlement. This was most important for the reason that all such
facts and information in every case are collected by experts sent immediately by
the railroads to the scene of the accident. The facts and information gathered by the
legal aid investigators are turned over to the claimant or to any attorney employed
to handle the case, whether it be regional counsel or someone else.
The plan at first was experimental and has been substantially changed over the
years to remove every detail that could serve as the basis for honest criticism, either
from the standpoint of law or of professional ethics. There is no longer any con-
tract between regional counsel and the Brotherhood and no portion of the fees are
now remitted to the Brotherhood. Its objective, however, is the same-to place the
Brotherhood back of the Liability Act plaintiff where the Moseley plan placed the
United States. The objective was immediately approved by the courts.38
It was not surprising, in view of the large economic interest involved, that the
railroads overlooked the humanitarian nature of the objective and made the plan the
subject of immediate and bitter attack. To give color to their attack, they adopted
the view that it was an ambulance-chasing outfit and that regional counsel were in
violation of canons of Ethics when they accepted the plan and represented Liability
Act claimants under it. The railroads by emphasizing the ambulance-chasing and
violation-of-legal-ethics theory, soon acquired as an ally, the organized bar, in their
" BRoTrHooI oF RAILROAD Tk iNzr, REPoR- oF THE PRESIDENT 266 (1930).
"
8 Ryan v. Pennsylvania R" R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1933); In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E. D. N. Y.
1933).
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fight against this new champion of employees' rights-the Legal Aid Department of
the Brotherhood. Members of local bar associations were persuaded that they were
letting business get away from them. They came to believe that they had a vested
interest in any case under the Act in which the cause of action arose in their
territory. "These Regional Counsel in the big cities," they reasoned, "were 'drain-
ing off' from their locality, business which should be kept at home. The big city
lawyer was growing rich while they were growing poor."
The entire story of this sordid procedure is told in a resolution adopted by two
Tennessee local bar associations on June 8, 1946. It was placed in the record at the
trial of a chancery suit at Knoxville which will later be described 9 Its pertinence
here is, first, its falsity as shown by comparison with the statements in the reports
of the president and general counsel in their 193o reports and with the findings of the
courts in the Ryan and O'Neil cases.4° Second, it leaves no question as to the real
reasons behind the fight against the Legal Aid Department. As taken from the
record in the chancery case where it became a public document, the two associations
resolved:
Whereas, it has come to the attention of the Knoxville Bar Association that certain
Railroad Brotherhoods have organized what is known as a Legal Aid Department ostensi-
bly to assist the members of the organization and their dependents in securing damages
for injuries sustained by railroad employees entitled to the benefits of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act and for the beneficiaries of such employees who are fatally injured
while engaged in the furtherance of interstate commerce, and such Legal Aid Department
has appointed attorneys in various sections of the United States, who are designated as
Regional Counsel for a certain territory and has also appointed Field Representatives in
the several territories, and that whenever an injury or death occurs, the Field Representa-
tive calls on the injured employee or the beneficiary of such employee for the purpose of
inducing said party to employ the so-called Regional Counsel, the result being that
lawyers in foreign states are soliciting and taking away business from lawyers in states
where the claims arise, and the practice of solicitation and transportation of claims is
seriously undermining the traditional ethical standards of lawyers. By reason of these
efforts on the part of the parties herein, many suits are brought in East St. Louis, Illinois
and in other places far distant from the place where the accident occurred or the plaintiff
resided.
Now, Therefore Be It Resolved, that we, the Knoxville and Knox County Bar Associa-
tion, go on record as condemning this solicitation of claims in the manner set out in this
resolution as being unethical and improper, and that a committee of three attorneys be
appointed by the President of this Association to institute an injunction bill to enjoin
such practices in the event any Regional Counsel or other representative of the Legal
Aid Department comes into the jurisdiction of the Courts of Knox County; that copies
of this Resolution be forwarded to Senators Kenneth D. McKellar and Tom Stewart, and
to Congressman John Jennings, Jr., of the Second Congressional District of Tennessee,
urging that legislation be passed in Congress confining the jurisdiction of suits under the
" Doughty v. Grills, in the Chancery Court for Knox County, Tennessee, before the Honorable
Charles E. Dawson, Chancellor, No. 34351, Injunction, PP. 24-25, Trial Court Record and pp. 84-85 of
Record made up and certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, W. H. Earle, Aug. 25,
1952.
"See note 38 supra.
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Federal Employers' Liability Act to the District Court of the district in which the in-
jured plaintiff resided at the time of the injuries on which the action is based, or in the
district in which plaintiffs intestate resided at the time of the injuries causing death; or
such action may be brought in the District Court of the United States in the district
where the cause of action arose; or such action may be brought in a State Court of
competent jurisdiction in the county where the injured plaintiff resided at the time of the
injuries, or where the plaintiff's intestate resided at the time of the injuries causing his
death or in the county in which the action arose;
Be It Further Resolved, that a committee from the local Bar Association be given
a copy of this Resolution and be authorized to present same to the appropriate com-
mittee of the Tennessee State Bar Association in convention at Memphis, and, if neces-
sary, on the floor of the convention itself, urging that appropriate measures be taken to
stop said unauthorized and unethical practices.
The committee appointed under the last paragraph of the resolution filed a suit
in chancery at Knoxville in 195o against an investigator of the Legal Aid Depart-
ment and a former local chairman of the local lodge of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, charging them with ambulance chasing in a complaint that closely
paralleled the language of the resolution. The case was tried before the chancellor
and a jury in March, i95i, five years after the resolution was adopted. The com-
mittee produced eighteen witnesses who testified on the merits of the case. The
witnesses were local railroad men who had been injured and widows of railroad
men who had been killed. All of them either settled, or sued on, their claims
against the railroad. Many of them had known one or the other or both of the
defendants for periods ranging froih a few months to a lifetime. While it was
shown that the defendants had, at the request of some of the witnesses, informed
them of their right to secure advice from the Legal Aid Department and regional
counsel about their cases; advised them that they need not employ regional counsel
but could employ any lawyer of their choice, including regional counsel, to handle
their claims; visited the injured in hospitals; attended and sent flowers to funerals;
visited the homes of deceased brothers to deliver to the widow proceeds of insurance
policies held by the deceased in the Brotherhood; adjusted deceased's retirement pay;
and sent food and clothing to the children and widows of deceased men, not a
single witness produced by the committee testified that the defendants had sought
to solicit the claim of any witness for any attorney, as charged in the complaint.
The case went to the jury on special interrogatories. The jury was out only
ten minutes. The verdict was not guilty. The chancellor dissolved a temporary
injunction that had been entered when the complaint was filed and dismissed the
suit. On appeal to the Court of Appeals in Knoxville, that court-not upon the
pleadings and the evidence, but upon inferences drawn from a combination of
assertions made in the resolution-selected bits of testimony of some of the witnesses,
the affirmative portions of defendants' answers, a portion of the Brotherhood's
constitution in evidence as to the Legal Aid Department, and a stipulation that no
FELA suits had been filed in the circuit courts of Knox county or in the federal
court in Knox county by injured Brotherhood members in the last ten years; and
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reversed the Chancellor's judgment. The Supreme Court of Tennessee denied a
petition for certiorari, July i8, 1952.41
The Knoxville and Knox county bar had five years in which to find a witness
that would pin the label of ambulance chaser on men employed by the Legal Aid
Department to carry out its humanitarian objectives or upon that agency of the
Brotherhood. They produced no such witness and won the case on the basis of the
unfounded charges made in the resolution which were not proved by any evidence
at the trial and which never could have rated any higher as admissible evidence
than any other purely irresponsible propaganda.
This and other activities of the organized bar were in complete disregard of the
right of claimants to sue the employer under the Act in East St. Louis, Illinois or
in any other eligible forum, as well as their right to recover maximum damages in
any suit they elected to file. These rights had only recently been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Boyd u. Grand Trunk Western Railroad, where the Court said :4 2
The vigor and validity of the Duncan decision was not impaired by Callen v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 U. S. 625 (1948). We there distinguished a full compromise
enabling the parties to settle their dispute without litigation, which we held did not
contravene the Act, from a device which obstructs the right of the Liability Act plaintiff
to secure the maximum recovery if he should elect judicial trial of his cause. And
nothing in Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55 (949), affects the initial choice of venue
afforded Liability Act plaintiffs. We stated expressly that the section of the Judicial
Code there involved, 28 U. S. C. §1404(a), "does not limit or otherwise modify any
right granted in §6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular
district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might
have been brought previously." 337 U. S. at 6o.
The right to select the forum granted in §6 is a substantial right. It would thwart
the express purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sanction defeat of that
right by the device at bar. (Italics supplied.)
The suit was also in complete disregard of another right that claimants have
under the Act itself. The Act provides."
* * . whoever, by threat, intimidation, order, rule, contract, regulation, or device what-
soever, shall attempt to prevent any person from furnishing voluntarily such informa-
tion to a person in interest ... shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not
more than $i,ooo or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both such fine and im-
prisonment, for each offense. (Italics supplied.)
" Certified Record, referred to in note 39, supra, at 584.
42 338 U. S. 263, 266 ('949).
"This comprehensive language of Section 1o, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. §6o (1946), is onepart of the 1939 Amendment that was essential to protect the injured employee or his next of kin fromknown devices designed to defeat claims under the Act by closing the avenues to facts and information
incident to accidents causing injury and death. One known device was a rule that provided, "Employees
who witness or have any knowledge of an accident, or of the facts involved, must not give information
concerning it or talk about the occurrence to the injured person, lawyers, or to any other person or
persons, unless legally required to so do, except only to company officials and claim agents. Information
given to this company's representatives shall be as complete as possible and all facts must be stated
whether favorable or unfavorable to anyone." See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on S. 1708, 76th Cong., ist Sess. 21 (1939).The Knoxville Bar suit described in the text was in marked degree a substitute for these obstructive
rules.
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This chancery suit was addressed to the chancellor, keeper of the public con-
science. The prayer for relief was in the name of justice, law, and professional
ethics. After the evidence was in, the chancellor and twelve jurors, all citizens of
Knox county, found nothing shocking to the public conscience and nothing in viola-
tion of law or professional ethics, and dispensed justice accordingly. The Court of
Appeals, although it found "no evidence whatever in the record as to the constitu-
tion of the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood as to what services that
department through its regional counsel performed, or was expected to perform, for
the members," reversed on the theory that the Legal Aid Plan "tends to show a
pattern with respect to efforts to have personal injury and death claims against
railroads sucked out of Knox County."44  The two defendants, under this decision,
are permanently restrained from exercising toward injured men and their next
of kin that "fraternal spirit of helpfulness" indicated by the word "Brotherhood"
upon which the general counsel in his Annual Report of 1929 rested his recommen-
dation that the Legal Aid Department be created. One cannot review the record in
this Knoxville proceeding, without a mental paraphrase of Madame Roland's
famous apostrophe to Liberty45 just before her execution: Oh, Legal Ethicsl What
travesties are committed in thy name.
Regional counsel do not have a monopoly of these Liability Act claims. Many
able, experienced, and honest lawyers throughout the nation by reason of established
reputation are employed by injured men and their next of kin. But the Legal Aid
Plan and the examples set by regional counsel, who work always within its spirit
and purpose, have established a standard, both as to fees and treatment of these
claimants, that has compelled even some out-and-out ambulance chasers to abandon
to some extent the old methods that smacked so much of banditry, in favor of
something like fair dealing. Moreover, unscrupulous claim agents find claimants
better informed about their rights and less apt to fall into the traps described so
accurately by Mr. Justice Wasservogel in his report referred to above.
This Legal Aid Plan of the Brotherhood can reasonably be given the chief
credit for the real effectuation of this national public policy.
III
The creation of the Legal Aid Department by the Brotherhood furnished one
of the major issues that gave rise to numerous controversies that punctuated the
administration of this national policy after the adoption by Congress of the venue
provision of the Act in i9io, and in particular after 193o. From that date down to
this day, the Association of American Railroads, generally, and numerous individual
railroads, in particular, have employed every conceivable method designed to obstruct
or to destroy the rights guaranteed by the Act's provisions to injured railroad men
and to their next of kin where injuries prove fatal.
In the first place, when cases reached the courts, railroad lawyers in their failure
"' Certified Record referred to in note 39, supra, at 448.
' 0 Libertyl What crimes are committed in thy name.
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or refusal to understand or to be guided by the spirit and purpose of the law,
grasped at every straw in the wind of hostile judicial philosophy and counted every
ruling tending to weaken the law or to reimpose old common-law defenses as a
crack in the wall of the edifice of justice to these men erected by Congress in this
legislation. The restrictive interpretations of the law thus gained were again swept
away by the 1939 Amendment.46
In the second place, many other devices and procedures were drawn from the
legal and propaganda arsenals of the railroads and the organized bar for the purpose
of preventing Liability Act claimants from breaking out of areas where attorneys
with skill and experience in handling these cases were usually under retainers by
the railroads and where the lawyers available to these claimants were not competent
to advise them as to their rights and to secure the maximum recovery for injury and
death to which they were entitled under the Act. There was what became popularly
known as the "Rock Island Release," in which an injured man was induced, for
the smallest consideration he would accept, to sign a written agreement that, if his
claim could not be amicably settled, he would bring suit in a particular court or in
the courts of a particular county, district or state. It took years to defeat this device
in the courts, but it was finally held invalid by the United States Supreme Court in
Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad.47 There was the attempt, by injunction,
to defeat the purpose of the Act, wherein the plaintiff was enjoined from prose-
cuting a suit brought in any court outside the "point, place or state" where plaintiff
lived or the accident happened. This practice ended in failure when it was ruled
out by the Supreme Court of the United States in two decisions.48 The device is
now being revived. In Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,49 the Supreme Court
of Georgia held that the Kepner and Miles decisions" ° were no longer controlling
since Congress in its revision of the Federal Judicial Code for the convenience of
parties and witnesses in the interest of justice, gave federal district courts the power
to transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.5 The Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari and the
case is now pending in that court.5" There was the attempt to use the doctrine of
forum non conveniens which ended when the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the doctrine was subject to one invariable limiting principle-namely, that
it was not applicable in cases arising under the FELA.5 '
The attack upon the venue provision had, in the meantime, been shifted to direct
action. The Association of American Railroads had acquired as an ally the organ-
ized bar, in so far as the leadership of its national and state bodies was concerned.
AD Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 (949).
47 338 U. S. 263 (1949).
AD Baltimore and 0. R. R. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 (1942): Miles v. Illinois Central R. R., 315 U. S.
698 (1942).
AD 209 Ga. 187, 7X S. E. 2d 243 (1952).
"o See note 48 supra.51 28 U. S. C. §1404(a) (1948).
12344 U. S. 863 (1952).
" United States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573, 596 (1948).
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The Knoxville bar put the resolution quoted above in the hands of Congressman
John J. Jennings, Jr., a resident of Knoxville, representing in Congress the Second
Congressional District of Tennessee. He introduced a bill, closely following di-
rections contained in the resolution, in the House as H. R. 1639, which in the Senate
became S. I567. ' The theory of the proponents was that repeal of the venue pro-
vision would end ambulance chasing in connection with the claims and would also
end the Brotherhood's Legal Aid Department. The array of proponents and op-
ponents of the bills appearing at the hearings before congressional committees led
to this accurately characterized description of the fight that ensued as a result of the
proposed legislation :
In this battle of the titans, the organized railroad transportation industry and the organ-
ized legal profession joined in supporting the proposal and were opposed by organized
railway labor.
It is of interest to note here that a special assistant to the Attorney General of
the United States presented a statement with respect to S. 1567 at the hearing before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in which the issues raised by the legislation
were analyzed and questions were raised as to the desirability of the changes in
legislative policy represented by the proposed repeal of the venue section of the Act."
Congressman Jennings, with the resolution of the Knoxville bar as a foundation
and guide, personally wrote "the Presidents of the Bar Associations of each of the
48 states and to hundreds of the presidents of the local bar associations throughout
the United States" in order to secure approval of H. R. 1639. He received resolu-
tions from most of the state bar associations, from the American Bar Association, and
from hundreds of county and city bar associations.57  The propaganda he sent out
and his testimony in the transcripts of hearings before congressional committees
labeled the Brotherhood Legal Aid Department as a nationwide racket, carrying
on a nefarious practice of active solicitation of cases arising under the Federal Act;
and depriving the local lawyer of litigation which in his view properly should be
handled in the forum where an accident occurred, or where the injured party resided,
at the time of the accident." He and other proponents of the bill, in order to
strengthen these claims as to the Legal Aid Department, used the skilled propa-
gandist's technique of establishing guilt by association. A notorious ambulance-
chasing case then pending in Chicago was dramatically interwoven with charges of
running, soliciting, and chasing of cases made against regional counsel of the Brother-
hood and brought to the attention of the committees by a former Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Illinois who had been employed by the railroads to prosecute
"' Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1567 and H. R. z639,
8oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
" Mangan, Federal Legislation, 37 Gao. L. J. 43 (1948).
"Hearings, supra note 54, at 12.
"Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 1639, 8oth
Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (x947).
" Id. at 12.
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the case. 9  References throughout the testimony of the various proponents of the
bill are made to regional counsel as ambulance chasers who "drain off" legal business
from local lawyers, enriching themselves and impoverishing the local lawyers.0 °
These prodigious efforts thus made to destroy the venue provision of the Act failed
when the bill died in committee in 19 48P'
Here again the reasons given by the proponents of H. R. 1639 and S. 1567 for
repealing the venue provision of the Act remind one of the historic utterance of
Madame Roland as she bowed before the clay statue of Liberty in the Place de la
Revolution on her way to the guillotine.
In 1939, near the end of the Seventy-Sixth Congress, the need for a comprehensive
revision of the United States Judicial Code (28 U. S. C.) was recognized. In that
and future Congresses, appropriate legislation was passed to provide for such a re-
vision. The statute representing such a revision went into preparation in 1944. It
was completed, introduced in Congress as H. R. 3214, and was pending in Congress
simultaneously with the Jennings Bill, H. R. 1639. Jennings, who introduced H. R.
1639 in the House, and at least one of the noted lawyers who appeared before the
House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary to urge its passage and who was then
representing one of the big western railroads in a notorious ambulance-chasing case
in Chicago, were on important committees in charge of the revision of the Judicial
Code. The Revision statute became law in June 1948, effective September i, 1948.61
After the new Code became law, it was discovered by railway labor which was
not represented on the revision staff or on any committee in charge of the revision,
that it contained the following harmless-appearing provision:6
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.
The Reviser, in his note to this section, stated that this provision had been drawn
in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens and he cited Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad v. Kepner, 4 as an example of the need for such a provision. The
controversy that arose, both in the federal and state courts, as to the effect of this
provision on FELA cases was settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Ex parte Collett,5 where the Court held that federal courts were given discretion by
the provision to transfer FELA cases along with all other civil cases, where the
provision applies. The Court took note in its opinion in Ex parte Collett, of the
assurances given to Congress by the revision staff and members of the committees
of the Senate and House that changes in the Code that could be deemed contro-
"' Id. at 16; see Hearings, supra note 54, at 38. See also Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. v.
Andrews, 338 Ill. App. 552, 88 N. E. 2d 364 (1949).
"o See Hearings before House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary on H. R. 1639 and S. 1567,
supra, notes 54 and 57.
" See 62 STAT. 989, amendment of §6, June 25, 1948, 45 U. S. C. A. §56 (1952).
02 28 U. S. C. §i et seq. 6128 U. S. 0. §1404(a) (i95o).
t 314 U. S. 44 (1942). as 337 U. S. 55 0949).
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versial had been studiously avoided. Congress was assured that, though changes
and improvements in existing law had been made, such as had been made were
of a wholly non-controversial nature. The Court, however, held in effect that these
assurances could not be considered as of any importance in deciding the case for
the reason that the provision was unanimously approved by Congress and that this
unanimity demonstrated that there was, in fact, nothing controversial about the
provision. The Court could have found, had it looked far enough, that the absence
of controversy resulted solely from the fact that only one side to the controversy was
present at every stage of the process of inserting this provision in the Revised Code,
from its initiation to its enactment as a part of the Code. Railway labor was not
there and had no warning that it needed to be there. Even the Department of
Justice which was affected by the provision in a manner very nearly as vital as rail-
way labor, although it studied and approved the complete Code, was not aware of
the provision's insidious character. These are the reasons for the failure of the pro-
vision to excite controversy in Congress when the Code became law.
In Hayes v. Chicago R. 1. & P. Railroad, the first case in which Section 1404(a)
was applied, the court in allowing a motion to transfer under the provision, said :0
There is no basic reason why plaintiffs in cases under the Federal Employers' Liabiliti
Act should not be subject to the same equitable doctrine of transfer as applies to all other
civil cases now that Congress has enacted a statute which indicates no exception to the
application of that principle.
Later the Supreme Court in Ex parte Collett held that the provision does not
limit or otherwise modify any right granted in Section 6 of the Act or elsewhere to
bring suit in any particular district.
In Naughton v. Pennsylvania Railroad, in denying a motion to transfer under
§1404(a), the court said:"'"
The view contended for by the defendant would come close to making §1404(a) a
venue statute, under which the court, after striking a nice balance of conveniences, would
be bound to limit the plaintiff to a single jurisdiction. If that had been the purpose, the
statute would have directed the courts to make transfers to the most convenient juris-
diction-a very different question from that involved in the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
The evolution of the interpretation and construction process in dealing with this
provision has carried the courts to the position that the power to transfer should be
exercised only in exceptional cases and to correct abuses."' However, under its in-
fluence, application of the doctrine of forum non convenienrs now rests upon the
policy and procedures in the several states rather than upon federal policy."0 But
it still remains true that in the 1939 amendment to the Act, which was the last time
the Act has been in need of repair, Congress not only adhered to its previous views,
79 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Minn. 1948).
0785 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E. D. Pa. 949).
as See United States v. Scott and Williams, 88 F. Supp, 531, 534 (S. D. N. Y., 1950).
0" Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (95o).
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but greatly strengthened and extended the protective features of the Act. It was still
acting under what it deemed to be the urge of the strongest and highest considera-
tions of justice and the promotion of the public welfare.
Thus, the integrity of the law, which was the chief concern of the Moseley and
Brotherhood Legal Aid plans, has been maintained through nearly a half century
of bitter controversy. As a result, the stringent liability placed upon the railroads
with the view that it would "compel the highest safeguarding of the lives and limbs
of the men in this dangerous employment," has borne visible fruit. In the year
19o7, when the Act of 19o6 was under attack and the Act of 19o8 was in the making,
the casualty lists showed 4,534 men killed and 87,644 injured. In i95o, with a greatly
increased number of men exposed to that danger, there were 392 killed and 22,586
injured."0
As was said in the beginning, the survival of such a policy when expressed in a
statute in the face of continuous and concerted attack upon it by those who profess
a philosophy hostile to it and by powerful interests claiming to be adversely affected
by it, thtough long periods of time during which the policy has been steadily
strengthened and broadened by the law-making body which declared it and by the
courts charged with the duty of construing it, constitutes the strongest proof of the
soundness of the policy. Congress has never departed from the high notion of its
handiwork held when this national public policy was announced in i9io and the
courts have settled down to that liberal construction of the law that is held to be
warranted by its humanitarian objectives. This national public policy has been fully
vindicated.
IV
This legislation has also survived the onslaughts of those disciples of change who
are easily persuaded that principles, unlike good wine, do not improve with age.
Let there be a condition that excites human propensities toward reform; a consequent
social problem; existing remedies keyed to the instinctive conflict between those to
be benefited and those who are to bear the costs of the benefits; a proposed remedy
that promises an expeditious and a more or less automatic solution, if these conflicts
be disregarded; an occasion for claiming that an idealistic reform is to be consum-
mated-and these disciples of change at once espouse the cause of promoting the
adoption of the new remedy. This is not said in disparagement of idealism. It
is idealism that sets the pace for practical measures to meet any problem. It was
Edward A. Moseley's practical idealism that in the face of intolerable conditions, led
to the Safety Appliance, Federal Employers' Liability, and other acts that now stand
as models for measures that are supplanting workmen's compensation laws.
The critics of the principle that fault is requisite to liability-written into the
FELA-have been overruled by time and experience. Congress, when the Employ-
ers' Liability Acts were under consideration, had before it the legislation of all of
7 0 
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the nations of continental Europe, Great Britain and its dominions, and the several
states of this nation, dealing with methods of compensation for accidental injury
and death.7 ' In the forty-four years since the Liability Act was passed in i9o8, there
have been twenty-six bills, introduced in twelve Congresses, to replace it with work-
men's compensation acts.72 It is now advocated that the workmen's compensation
principle of liability without fault be extended to cover all cases of accidental injury
and death, traditionally covered by the common law of torts.
73
The principle of liability without fault was society's original method of com-
pensation for any sort of damage done to one person by another. He who inno-
cently caused damage to another was required to make the injured person whole.
The innocent was in a position no different from the wrongdoer of that time. This
principle was abandoned about the year 140o A.D. and replaced by the principle
that fault is essential to create liability. The modern workmen's compensation acts,
five hundred years later, in principle, gave recrudescence to this ancient rule of law.
74
The two principles have been competing for survival in this country for a half
century and in particular ever since the enactment of the present FELA.
Recent important events have made it unnecessary to re-argue the relative merits
of these two principles. In July, 1946, the Departmental Committee on Alternative
Remedies in England, was instructed among other things :71
(a) To consider, having regard to the observations on the subject of alternative
remedies in the Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services, and to any developments
which announcements by the Government show to be contemplated in connection with
that Report, how far the recovery or proceedings for the recovery of damages or com-
pensation in respect of personal injury caused by negligence should affect, or be affected by,
the provision made or proposed to be made under Workmen's Compensation legislation
or under any social insurance or other statutory schemes for affording financial or other
assistance to persons incapacitated by injury or sickness, or their dependents:
(b) To consider, having regard to any relevant observations in the aforesaid Report
and in the Report of the Law Revision Committee on Contributory Negligence, whether
in the case of injuries to workmen due to their employment, any alteration is desirable
in the law governing the liability of employers and third parties to pay damages or com-
pensation to workmen and their legal representatives and dependents, independently of
the Workmen's Compensation Acts.
As a result of the study made under these instructions, there was submitted to the
" 'Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee Having Under Consideration H. 239 and S. 156 and
S. z657 Relating to Liability of Common Carriers by Railroads in District of Columbia and Territories
and Common Carriers by Railroads Engaged in Commerce Between States and Between States and Foreign
Nations to Their Employees, 59th Cong., ist Sess. (i9o6); Hearings before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee on H. R. 17o36 Relating to Liability of Common Carriers to Employees, 6oth Cong., ist Sess.
(1908).
"'Pollack, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases, 36 CORNELL L. Q.
236, 271 (i95).
"'Malone, Workmen's Compensation Law, 9 NACCA L. J. 20 (1952).
"Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARv. L. REV. 235, 239 (1913-1914).
71 FINAL R)EPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMIrEE ON ALTERNAT[VE REMEDIES, Cm. No. 686o
(1946).
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Minister of National Insurance by Sir Walter J. Monckton, Chairman of the Com-
mittee, a Final Report, in July, 1946,76 which led to the enactment by Parliament
of The Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act of I948. 7 This law repealed all work-
men's compensation acts.78 It became the master statute of a group of laws closely
similar to the group of laws enacted by Congress-the Safety Appliance Acts,7 the
Railroad Retirement Act,"0 and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance ActS-of
which the FELA is the master statute.
The English Act of 1948 provides for recovery of damages resulting from the
negligence of the employer. The injured employee may draw upon the insurance
fund for disability caused by his injuries to sustain him until his claim is settled
or he collects a judgment at the end of a law suit. From the proceeds of recovery
he repays the amount drawn from the insurance fund. Thus the very citadel of
workmen's compensation has returned to the principle that fault is requisite to
liability.
A study has just been completed under the authority of the University of Illinois
in which the superiority of the FELA system over that of the workmen's compensa-
tion system is conceded. The authors of the Report resulting from the study quote,
approvingly, the following conclusion of "an experienced compensation attorney"
as to the workmen's compensation system :82
The utopia of speed and simplicity sought by the legislators has eluded the injured
worker, and legal representation remains indispensable. In fact, boards or commissions
generally have come to frown upon an employee's appearing without counsel, or a lay-
man's attempting to practice before them.
A substantial percentage of these railroad cases arises under the Safety Appliance
Acts, under the provisions of which the duty of the carrier is absolute and proof of
negligence is not required."' Even where the carrier is under the qualified duty to
use ordinary care, the injured railroad employee and his next of kin under the Federal
Act have experienced much less difficulty in establishing that injury and death re-
sulted, "in whole or in part" from the employer's negligence, than is met under the
workmen's compensation system by a claimant in establishing that the accident
arose "out of and in the course of employment." As Mr. Justice Murphy said:"8
The statutory phrase "arising out of and in the course of the employment," which
appears in most workmen's compensation laws, is deceptively simple and litigiously
prolific.
70 Ibid.
"Acts of 9 & io GEo. 6, c. 6a, II & 12 GEo. 6, C. 41. See BUTTERWORTH'S TWENTIETH CENTURY
STATUTES 1592 (1948).
" BuTrERWORTH, op. ct. supra, at 1594, Historical Note.
70 27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§I-46 (1946).
so 50 STAT. 307 (1937), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §238 et seq. (1946).
s' 52 STAT. 1094 (1938), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §351 et seq. (1946).
"ALFRED F. CONARD AND ROBERT I. MEHR, COSTS Op ADMINISTERING REPARATION FOR WORK INJURIES
IN ILLINOIS 9 (GRADUATE COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, 1952). See also Conard, Workmen's Com-
pensation: Is It More Efficient Than Employer's Liability?, 38 A. B. A. J. IOii (1952).
"'O'Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 338 U. S. 384 (x949).
"i Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 479 (I947).
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The truth of this statement is fully borne out by the space in the American
Digest system required in the digest of workmen's compensation litigation-2253
pages in the Fourth Decennial and 3452 pages in the Fifth Decennial.
The litigious aspect of the workmen's compensation principle is not its worst
feature. Its awards are wholly inadequate and its administration, according to the
Illinois University study, is much more expensive than is the administration of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act's methods and procedures.8 4 Comparisons are not
necessary here. Those who are interested in studies reflecting the adequacy of
awards under the two systems are referred to volumes i to 9 of the NACCA Law
Journal where awards under both systems are listed and appropriate comments are
made.
The claimant under the FELA who takes his case to regional counsel of the
Brotherhood or to any reputable, skilled and experienced lawyer will secure verdicts
in court adequate to give him fair compensation for injury or death. The amounts
recovered are sustained so long as they do not strike the court as monstrous. In
Affolder v. New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad, where injuries resulted
in the loss of one leg, the jury returned a verdict for $8o,ooo.oo. The United States
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit had reversed. 5 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, said:"'
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of damages awarded by the
District Court's judgment is not monstrous in the circumstances of this case. Barry v.
Edmunds, ii6 U. S. 550 (x886). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.
In such cases, when the injured man leaves regional counsel's office with his
check, the amount of that check represents approximately 75 per cent of the amount
recovered. When he leaves the office of any other skilled, experienced lawyer,
the amount of his check represents from approximately 65 to 75 per cent of his
recovery. This is true whether the amount recovered is by suit or in settlement.
The influence of affirmance of adequate verdicts and the settlements secured
through able counsel, enables injured men and their next of kin to make many
satisfactory settlements without the necessity of employing counsel. Conservatively,
as a result of such verdicts and settlements in these cases, 95 per cent of claims are
settled, either without suit, or if suit is brought, before the case goes to the jury.
Moreover, what is still more important, the effect of these adequate settlements and
verdicts is to cause the railroad employer to provide the highest safeguards to the
lives and limbs of railroad workers that care, diligence, and efficiency can produce.
Any regional counsel or any other able and experienced attorney who handles
these cases will testify that the number of cases in which no recovery can be had by
reason of inability to prove negligence and that injury or death was due in whole or
"' CoNARD AND MEr, op. cit. supra note 82, at 43, Table 7.
sr 174 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1948).
so339 U. S. 96, 101 (1950).
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in part to that negligence are small. Yet, the courts have not made this Federal
Act into a workmen's compensation law. 7
While government has rarely ever adopted a measure designed as a solution of
some important social problem that could not be improved with time and experi-
ence, there has not yet been found any method of compensating injured railroad
men and their next of kin that can be substituted satisfactorily for that provided by
Congress in the FELA and the group of laws designed to supplement it. It has
proved worthy to stand beside and in a position of equality with the remedies open
to seamen, both in admiralty and in the law courts.
Since i888, when, under Mr. Moseley's directions, scientific methods of keeping
statistics of operative railroad casualties were adopted, there have been i25,o0o op-
erative railroad men killed and 4,293,326 injured in reportable accidents88 It is the
personal, social and economic impact of this staggering human overhead of an in-
dustry, in which these millions suffered and died at their posts of duty, and in which
their successors serve while faced with a similar fate, that has determined operative
railroad men to fight for improvement in and for the preservation of this national
public policy.
" See Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U. S. 477, 485 (I947); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 61-
62 (1948).
8" INTRSTATE COMMRC=E CoMMIss oN, ACCIDENT BuLL. No. i19 (APPENDiX A, SUMMARY STATEMENTS
OF RAILWAY ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES FOp. THE YEARs 1888-1950) 112 (95i).
